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INTRODUCTION
Canada's economic well-being depends vitally upon foreign trade, which
accounts for nearly fifty per cent of its gross national product. Traditionally,
this important sector of the national economy has relied predominantly on
the United States and British markets. The recent American surcharge
on imports, together with Britain's entry into the Common Market, have
accelerated Canadian efforts to search for alternative markets in Asia, in-
cluding China.1
Sino-Canadian trade relations have a relatively long history, going back
to the last century, when Canada imported Chinese laborers to construct
its transcontinental railway. But the overall volume of trade remained small
until the 1950's, when the United States imposed an embargo on strategic
trade with China. The breakthrough came in 1961, when China began its
mass wheat purchases from Canada.2 By 1971, Canada had become China's
fourth most important trading partner (after Japan, Hong Kong, and West
Germany) with a total trade volume of U.S. $277 million.3 It is expected
that Canadian exports to, and imports from, China for 1973 will surpass
the record levels reached in 1972, when two-way trade totaled over $300
million. 4
Over the years Canadian sales to China in addition to wheat have included
raw materials, semi-finished products, chemicals, and advanced electronics,
transport, mining and agricultural equipment. But since 1961 wheat, the
backbone of the prairie economy, has always been the dominant commodity,
accounting for about ninety per cent of Canadian exports to China. It is
because of the wheat sales that the bilateral trade balance has been over-
whelmingly in Canada's favor. In 1972, for example, China ran a $210 million
trade deficit with Canada, and for 1973 the deficit could reach $250 million.
Although the absolute volume of Sino-Canadian trade is relatively small, 5
*Associate Professor of Law, Queen's University, Canada.
' That it has been Canada's policy to develop trade and friendly relations with the "Pacific
Rim" countries, see HON. MITCHELL SHARP, FOREIGN POLICY FOR CANADIANS: PACIFIC (Ottawa,
Dep't of External Affairs, 1970) (a foreign policy white paper for the government of Canada).
2 This breakthrough resulted from a series of coincidences: three successive years of bad har-
vests in China followed by the Sino-Soviet break; a huge wheat surplus in Canada; and a strong-
willed Canadian Prime Minister, John G. Diefenbaker, who had been elected from the wheat-growing
prairies.
' See Godson, China Makes Economic Progress, CANADA COMMERCE, Mar. 1973, at 2, 6. Hereinafter,
all dollar references are to U.S. dollars.
4 See Press Statement of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau in Peking on October
13, 1973, in DEP'T OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES No. 73/20 (1973).
In a good year, such as 1968, sales to China barely exceeded 1 per cent of Canadian exports,
while imports from China were less than 0.2 per cent of Canada's total imports. Canada's share of
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it is thus very important to the Canadian economy and to its trade balance
generally.
Sino-Canadian trade has been conducted within a legal framework,
including specific contracts, trade agreements, the domestic law of both
countries and, until recently, laws of the United States. Since there is no
dearth of literature depicting the legal structure of China's foreign trade,
that topic will not be discussed here.6 Rather, this article will examine
(1) Sino-Canadian commercial agreements, (2) Canadian export and import
controls, and (3) contracting practices.
SINO-CANADIAN COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS
7
Since they recognized each other's government in 1970, Canada and
China have concluded a series of bilateral agreements which constitute
the basis for commercial relations between the two countries. The most
important of these is the 1973 Trade Agreement" which was signed in Peking
by the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau. The Agreement,
which has a term of three years, is a relatively simple document consisting
of eleven articles. It provides for the reciprocal granting of most-favored-
nation (MFN) status, sets forth the types of currencies to be used for pay-
ments, provides for certain assurances of easier access by businessmen to
each other's markets, and establishes a Joint Trade Committee to monitor
implementation of the Agreement.9 The major features of the Agreement,
with the exception of the currency provisions, will be examined in this sec-
tion. Currency matters will be taken up in the discussion of contractual
terms relating to payments.
A. MFN Treatment
Both Canada and China employ the most-favored-nation clause as a
fundamental principle of their trade treaties and agreements. Thus, in
article 2 of the Sino-Canadian Trade Agreement, each side promises to
extend MFN status to products of the other with regard to "customs duties,
all taxes and subsidiary charges.., as well as to other relevant formalities,
regulations and procedures." However, article 3 makes clear that article 2 does
not apply to preferences granted by either government to neighboring
China's trade has been somewhat more important, but is still only around a 5 to 6 per cent level.
See S.P.S. Ho & R. W. HUENEMANN, CANADA'S TRADE WITH CHINA: PATTERNS AND PROSPECTS 11
(1972).
' For useful discussions of the topic, see Cohen, Chinese Law and Sino-American Trade, in CHINA
TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POLICY (A. Eckstein ed. 1971); Hsiao, Communist China's Foreign
Trade Organization, 20 VAND. L. REv. 303 (1967).
7 For a general discussion of China's foreign trade agreements, see Hsiao, Communist China's
Trade Treaties and Agreements (1949-64), 21 VAND. L. REv. 623 (1968).
s Trade Agreement Between Canada and the People's Republic of China (mimeo, Oct. 13,
1973).
The Sino-Canadian Trade Agreement seems to follow the same pattern as that established
by China's recent trade pacts with Australia and Japan. For brief reports on these pacts, see FAR
EASTERN ECON. REv., Aug. 6, 1973, at 29; id., Sept. 10, 1973, at 45.
SINO-CANADIAN TRADE
countries to facilitate border trade or as a result of participation in a customs
union, a free trade area such as the Canada-United States Auto Pact, 10 or
other such arrangements. Examples of the last category would be privileges
granted as a result of the British Preferential Tariff" and under the resolution
adopted by the 1968 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
to developing countries.' 2 In addition, there is a broad exception in article 9
which permits either country to take restrictive measures to protect "national
security and economic interests, human, animal and plant life or health,
and .. national historical relics." Existing Canadian controls on strategic
exports, quotas, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, and health and
safety regulations regarding imports are therefore fully preserved by ar-
ticle 9.13
It is questionable, however, whether the MFN clause in the Trade Agree-
ment will have a significant effect on future trade between the two countries.
Even before the conclusion of the Trade Agreement, Peking's exports to
Canada had always enjoyed MFN treatment under a modus vivendi entered
into between Canada and Nationalist China in 1946.14 Moreover, since
Canada grants the British Preferential Tariff to all British Commonwealth
Countries' 5 and extends MFN treatment to almost all other countries (in-
cluding the U.S.S.R. and a number of other communist countries),' 6 Chinese
goods will not, as a result of the MFN clause, gain a competitive advantage
in Canadian markets.' 7 For Canada, MFN treatment by the Chinese will
also be of limited value. China is a country with a centrally planned economy.
The state controls imports and exports, and determines types, assortment,
origin, and distribution of goods. Thus, the reciprocal reduction of tariffs
under the MFN clause by China may not achieve an increase in export op-
portunities for Canadian firms as an MFN clause is generally intended to do.' s
10 Automobile Products Agreement with Canada, Jan. 16, 1965, 11966] 1 U.S.T. 1372,
T.I.A.S. No. 6093; [19661 Can. T.S. No. 14.
n The British Preferential Tariff is extended to countries forming the British Commonwealth
of Nations. The names of these countries are listed in the Customs Tariff Act, CAN. REV. STAT.
c. C-41, § 3(2) (1970). The tariff rates are set forth in Schedule A of the same Act.
12 U.N. CTAD Resolution 21(11) (Mar. 26, 1968), U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON ITS SECOND SESSION WITH RELATED DOCUMENTS. CMND. No.
3649, at 74 (1968) (presented to Parliament by the President of the Board of Trade).
13 Problems concerning Canada's export and import controls on Sino-Canadian trade will be
discussed in Part II, infra (CANADIAN EXPORT AND IMPORT CONTROLS).
14 Exchange of Notes Between Canada and China Constituting a Commercial Modus Vivendi
Between the Two Countries, Sept. 26, 1946, [1946] Can. T.S. No. 37.
15 Even after Britain's entry into the EEC, the Customs Tariff Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-41
(1970), has yet to be amended to terminate the application of the British Preferential Tariff to
British goods.
16 The communist countries which enjoy MFN treatment by Canada are Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia. See McGOLDRICK'S CANADIAN CUSTOMS AND
EXCISE TARIFFS 1973-74, at 100-02 (1973).
17 China's main competitors in Canadian markets are Hong Kong and Taiwan, and both enjoy
MFN treatment by Canada. Hong Kong is one of the few Commonwealth political entities not
granted Preferential Tariff concessions by Canada. Taiwan continues to receive MFN treatment
by Canada even though Canada has breached diplomatic relations with the government of Nationalist
China.
16 For discussions of the futility of the MFN clause in economic relations between market econ-
omies and planned economies, see S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE: GUIDELINES FOR TRANS-
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However, since in the Sino-Canadian Trade Agreement the most-favored-
nation principle is applied not only to tariffs but also to "formalities, regula-
tions and procedures," it may at least serve to protect Canadian traders
from other discriminatory measures by the Chinese bureaucracy. Perhaps
articles 1 and 6, which require the contracting parties to "endeavor to
create favorable conditions" for trade and to "facilitate (in accordance with
their import and export requirements and possibilities) the development
of... long-term commercial arrangements," may prove to be more sig-
nificant for the future expansion of commerce between the two countries.
B. Easier Access to China for Canadian Businessmen
One of the most important achievements of the Trade Agreement is its
facilitation of business contacts between the two countries. Thus, in article 7,
both sides "undertake to promote the interchange of persons, groups and
delegations engaged in trade." During the negotiations, the two parties
further agreed that a program of such interchanges would be established
in the near future.' 9
In the past, a major complaint of Canadian businessmen has been the
number of practical obstacles encountered in conducting trade with China.
Thus no Canadian company except Canadian Pacific Air (CP Air) has been
permitted to establish a formal resident office in China for the purpose of
market investigation and product promotion,20 nor have Canadian com-
panies been able to engage Chinese government corporations as agents to
carry out commercial activities in China. The means for business contacts
between Canadian traders and Chinese state trading corporations are
still confined largely to the use of correspondence and to face-to-face nego-
tiations at the semiannual Canton Trade Fair.2 1 Direct negotiations outside
the Fair, through the exchange of trade delegations, are now becoming
more frequent, and occasionally when the Chinese have a serious interest
in a particular product, Canadian businessmen are invited to Peking for
talks with the Chinese trading corporations. 22
Nevertheless, the Chinese continue to display a marked preference for
restricting their main dealings with noncommunist countries to the semi-
annual Canton Trade Fair. When correspondence is used, moreover, some
ACTIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 195-98 (1970); Domke & Hazard, State Trading and the Most-
Favored-Nation Clause, 52 Am. J. INT'L L 55, 67-68 (1958). See also Pisar, Coexistence and Commerce
With Russia and China: Ground Rules for East-West Trade, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING
BUSINESS WITH SINO-SoviwT NATIONS 1, 5 (J. Haight ed. 1973).
9 See note 4 supra.
20 By the terms of article 13 of the Sino-Canadian Air Transport Agreement, CP Air, as the
designated Canadian airline to fly to China, is specially permitted to establish a resident office in
China "to station representatives and staff required for the operation of the agreed services."
See note 24 infra.
21 For a first-hand account of the Fair, see Klingenberg, The Canton Trade Fair: The Initiation of
United States-Chinese Trade, 13 VA.J. INT'L L 63 (1972). For a Canadian experience at the Fair, see
Kaufman, Come to the Fair, FOREIGN TRADE, Oct. 1970, at 11 (Spec. Supp.).
22 Another opportunity for mutual business contacts was provided by the two solo trade ex-
hibitions held in the fall of 1972-one for Canadian goods in Peking and the other for the Chinese
in Toronto. See Toronto Globe and Mail, Aug. 15, 1972, at 8, col. 1; id., Sept. 16, 1972, at 27, col. 1.
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Canadian businessmen have been perturbed by the fact that once they have
made a detailed offer to the Chinese at great expense, they often receive
only a terse reply, if any at all, without any explanation of what was unsatis-
factory about the offer.23 It is hoped that improved opportunities for Ca-
nadian businessmen to conduct their affairs in China as provided for in the
Trade Agreement will lessen these difficulties.
C. Joint Trade Committee
The most concrete achievement of the Trade Agreement is perhaps
article 8, which provides for the establishment of a Joint Trade Committee
"to facilitate the implementation" of the Agreement. The provision calls for
meetings at least once each year, to be held alternately in Peking and Ottawa.
When necessary, special meetings may also be arranged to discuss matters
of mutual interest.
The Committee will be very useful in many respects. The yearly inter-
governmental consultation will provide an effective means for solving prob-
lems which might otherwise hamper expansion of trade between the two
countries. Should the Chinese exports cause or threaten to cause disrup-
tion in Canada's domestic market, the Committee could serve as a con-
venient and useful forum for direct negotiation in order to find ways to either
prevent or remedy the situation. Above all, Canadian officials will be able
through such meetings to obtain official information on China's import
priorities and export possibilities, and thus be in a position to organize
visits by Canadian trade missions in the fields mentioned by the Chinese.
D. Other Trade Agreements
In addition to the general Trade Agreement, Canada and China also
concluded two other trade-related agreements in 1973-one on air trans-
port24 and the other concerning reciprocal trademark registration.
25
1. Air Transport Agreement
The Sino-Canadian Air Transport Agreement, which follows the general
pattern of China's civil aviation agreements with noncommunist countries,
2 6
is consistent with many of the Chicago Convention principles.27 In the
23 See Cutler, China Wants Only Those Visitors Who Are Useful, Financial Post, Nov. 3, 1973,
at 7, col. 1.
24 Civil Air Transport Agreement Between Canada and the People's Republic of China,
signed at Ottawa, June 11, 1973, and entered into force on the same date (mimeo, 1973) [herein-
after referred to as Air Transport Agreement].
2' Exchange of Notes Between Canada and the People's Republic of China Constituting an
Agreement Concerning Reciprocal Registration of Trade Marks, signed at Peking, July 16, 1973,
and entered into force on the same date (mimeo, 1973).
26 Since China is not a party to any multinational civil aviation convention except the Warsaw
Convention of 1929, which it accepted in 1958, China relies on a series of bilateral aviation agree-
ments as the legal basis of its international civil air transport. For an excellent discussion of China's
civil air transport agreements, see King & Roosevelt, Civil Aviation Agreements of the People's Republic
of China, 14 HARV. J. INT'L L. 316 (1973).
27 Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago, Dec. 7, 1944. 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
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Agreement, each contracting party grants to the other rights of transit across
its territory, discharge of passengers and freight in its territory, and em-
barkation of passengers and freight within its territory.28 These are known
as the first, third, and fourth of the "five freedoms" of international civil
aviation.29 Although there is no mention of the second freedom-the freedom
of landing for non-traffic technical purposes-article 8 of the Agreement
expressly requires aiding each other's aircraft when in distress. This seems
to grant a restricted version of the second freedom. With respect to the
fifth freedom-the right of carriage of traffic between the territory of the
other contracting party and a third country-it has been agreed to leave this
to future negotiation between the aviation authorities of the two countries. 30
The traffic right expressly excluded is the right to cabotage along the desig-
nated routes in the territory of the other contracting party. The exclusion
is apparently designed to protect the embryonic Chinese airline, the General
Administration of Civil Aviation of China (GACAC), from Canadian com-
petition. 31
Pursuant to the Air Transport Agreement, the Canadian Department
of Transport and GACAC have signed a supplementary technical Protocol
setting out detailed arrangements related to the operation of the agreed
air services.3 2 By the same authorization and with the approval of civil avi-
ation authorities of the two countries, CP Air and the Department of Inter-
national Affairs of GACAC (the two airlines designated by the contracting
parties) have concluded a commercial agreement prescribing the tariff,
frequency, and capacity for air services by the two airlines.33 As a result
of these aviation agreements, China's designated carrier will be able to
operate flights between China, Vancouver, and Ottawa. CP Air will operate
services between Canada, Shanghai, and Peking.3 4 The air link thus estab-
lished will improve business contacts and increase exchange of goods
between the two countries.
2. Reciprocal Trademark Registration
The Reciprocal Trademark Registration Agreement took the form of an
28 The "five freedoms" are contained in the International Air Transport Agreement, opened
for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1701, E.A.S. No. 469, 171 U.N.T.S. 387.
29 Air Transport Agreement, Annex, art. 11 (1), (2), & (3).
30 Id. art. 15.
31 Id., Annex, art. 15.
32 Protocol Between the Department of Transport of Canada and the General Administration
of Civil Aviation of China Concerning Technical Requirements and Procedures Related to the
Operation of the Agreed Air Services, signed and entered into force on June 11, 1973 (mimeo,
1973).
33 Air Transport Agreement, arts. 7, 8, & 13. See also Toronto Globe and Mail, Oct. 16, 1973,
§ B, at 6, col. 1.
34 CP Air is expected to commence air service to China as soon as the transit and refueling
arrangements with the Japanese authorities have been worked out. The Japanese are, however,
reported to be reluctant to grant these concessions to CP Air before Japan itself has established
an air link with China. See Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 10, 1973, § B, at 3, col. 7. Meanwhile,
despite the rights granted by the Air Transport Agreement, the Chinese airline is not expected to
commence service to Canada in the near future. See id., May 20, 1972, at 12, col. 5.
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exchange of notes signed on July 16, 1973.3' The Agreement provides that
"persons, partnerships, companies, corporations and governmental enter-
prises of either country may apply for registration of trademarks in the other
country in accordance with its law and be granted the right to exclusive
use thereof." Thus, a Canadian company may now apply to the Chinese
authorities, namely the Central Administration of Industry and Commerce
(CAIC),36 for registration of a trademark if the trademark is already duly
registered under the name of the company in Canada under the Trade Marks
Act. 37 Under Chinese regulations, the duration of the right to exclusive
use of the foreign trademark is to be determined at the discretion of the
CAIC.38 Likewise, a Chinese state enterprise may register its trademark in
Canada, although no such registration is necessary for the protection of
trademarks under Canadian common law.
China does not have patent law as it is known in the West.39 The lack
of patent protection in China does not, however, constitute a significant
impediment to Sino-Canadian trade. In fact, during the 1972 Canadian Trade
Exposition in Peking, many Canadian exhibitors sold their sample items
of electronics and telecommunication equipment which had been on display,
although it was known that the Chinese purchased such sophisticated
equipment for imitation purposes. Probably correctly, these Canadian
businessmen were of the opinion that there were practical limits to the
plagiarism of modern technology. Moreover, it would be far cheaper for
China to continue importing these sophisticated items than for it to try to
meet its own needs with domestic copies which might become obsolete
by the time they are manufactured. In any case, foreign exporters of modern
technological goods who wish to prevent the Chinese from copying can
always insist on such a clause in the contract of sale.
E. Related Agreements
In addition to the above-mentioned commercial agreements, there is an-
other series of bilateral agreements between Canada and China which will
facilitate the movement of persons between the two countries. Among these
are agreements on exchanges in cultural, sports, medical sciences, health care,
and scientific fields. Most important are agreements on consular affairs, which
include understandings in three areas. The broadest of these is an under-
standing concerning the formal establishment of consular relations between
the two countries to be conducted "in accordance with the general principles
and practice of international law." Included in the understanding is a provision
calling for each side to set up a consulate general in the other country-the
Chinese in Vancouver and the Canadians in either Canton or Shanghai. 40
35 See note 25 supra.
36 For a general discussion of registration of foreign trademarks in China, see Hsiao, Communist
China's Foreign Trade Organization, 20 VAND. L. REv. 303, 317-18 (1967).
37 CAN. REV. STAT. C. T-10 (1970).
3' See note 36 supra.
39 See PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, TRADE WITH CHINA 78-79 (1971).
4' Consular Understanding Between Canada and the People's Republic of China, in the form
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The other two understandings concern the simplification of visa procedures
and the reunification of families. 41 While all these agreements are not strictly
trade-related, they can be seen as steps necessary to provide a suitable back-
ground for trade.
Last, but not least, is the problem concerning Canada's international
claims against China for losses resulting from Peking's nationalizations and
other takings of Canadian properties after October 1, 1949. So far only the
"Ming Sung claim" has been settled.42 Yet to be resolved is Canada's official
claim with respect to its former embassy in Nanking and an unknown number
of private claims. (The Canadian government is presently in the process of
identifying the number of such private claims and the volume of losses in-
volved.) An agreement between the two countries to settle these outstanding
claims is necessary if a potential impediment to trade is to be avoided.
II
CANADIAN EXPORT AND IMPORT CONTROLS
The principal Canadian legislation for the control of exports is the Export
and Import Permits Act,43 which is administered by the Department of Industry,
Trade, and Commerce." This Act gives the government basic authority to
deny exports to communist countries when such exports are considered to
be detrimental to the security of Canada.
of an exchange of notes signed in Peking on Oct. 24, 1973 (mimeo, 1973).
. 41 Understanding on Reunion of Families Between Canada and the People's Republic of China,
in the form of an exchange of notes signed in Peking on Oct. 24, 1973.
42 The agreement settling the "Ming Sung claim" took the form of an exchange of notes. See
Exchange of Notes Between Canada and the People's Republic of China Settling and Terminating
the Loans Contracted by the Ming Sung Industrial Co., Ltd., from the Canadian Banks on October
30, 1946, signed and entered into force on June 4, 1973 (mimeo, 1973). The claim arose out of a
loan obtained by the Chinese Ming Sung Industrial Company in 1946 from three Canadian banks
to finance construction of nine vessels by two Canadian companies. The loan was guaranteed
by the Canadian government. The vessels were built and delivered to the Chinese company in
1949. After the establishment of the Peking government in the same year, the Ming Sung Company
was nationalized and was prevented from making the payments pursuant to the terms of the loan.
Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the guarantee, the Canadian government had to pay ap-
proximately $14.5 million to the Canadian banks between 1951 and 1960. In settling the claim,
the Chinese government agreed to repay the full amount, without interest. See Dep't of External
Affairs, Press Release No. 54 (June 4, 1973). For a discussion of the general practice with regard
to Canadian international claims, see Copithorne, State Responsibility and International Claim
(mimeo, Dep't of External Affairs, 1972).
43 CAN. REV. STAT. c. E-17, as amended (1970).
44 There are, in addition, export controls over various specialized goods administered by other
governmental departments and agencies. These specialized goods and the controlling agencies
include: radioactive materials, Atomic Energy Control Board, pursuant to the Atomic Energy
Control Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. A-19 (1970); gold, Department of Finance, pursuant to the Gold
Export Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-12 (1970); narcotic drugs and marijuana, Department of Justice,
pursuant to the Narcotic Control Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. N-I (1970); oil, gas, and power, National
Energy Board, pursuant to the National Energy Board Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. N-6 (1970); vessels,
Department of Transport, pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. S-9 (1970);
wheat, oats, and barley, Canadian Wheat Board, pursuant to the Canadian Wheat Board Act,
CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-12 (1970); and certain agricultural commodities, various marketing boards,
pursuant to the Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act, CAN. STAT. C. C-65 (1970-72).
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Under section 3 of the Act, the Governor in Council is authorized to estab-
lish an Export Control List, 45 chiefly for the purpose of regulating strategic
trade. The Act also provides for the maintenance of an Area Control List,
including therein "any country the export of any goods to which he [the Gover-
nor in Council] deems it necessary to control. '46 Pursuant to the Act, every ex-
port (to any country in the world except the United States) of goods included in
the Export Control List, or every shipment of goods (whether included in the
Export Control List or not) to any country named in the Area Control List,
requires an Export Permit. 47 Since China is a country included in the Area
Control List, 48 all sales to that country are subject to the Export Permit re-
quirement unless the goods are those which can be exported under a general
authorization known as a General Export Permit. 49
Because of the vital importance of exports to its economic well-being,50
Canada has always followed policies designed to minimize restrictions on trade.
Thus, in determining whether an Export Permit should be issued under the
Export and Import Permits Act for a particular sale to China, the attitude of
the Canadian government has regularly been not to go beyond the minimum
embargo of strategic trade required by COCOM.51 Consequently, if goods
destined for China are not of United States origin and are not of a strategic
nature prohibited in the COCOM embargo lists, an Export Permit is readily
available. Moreover, since throughout the past two decades the COCOM lists
have periodically been revised and the number of embargo items steadily
reduced, Canadian export controls have long ceased to be an important ob-
stacle to Sino-Canadian trade.
Indeed, until the recent relaxation of the American embargo against China,
the chief legal obstacles encountered by Canada in its trade with China did
lz SOR/70-502, 104 CANADA GAZETTE, pt. II, No. 23, at 1344 (Nov. 17, 1970).
48 Export and Import Permits Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. E-17, as amended, § 4 (1970). The current
Area Control List covers Rhodesia and all communist countries except Yugoslavia. See SOR/70-501,
104 CANADA GAZETTE, pt. II, No. 23, at 1343 (Nov. 17, 1970).
47 CAN. REV. STAT. c. E-17, as amended, § 13 (1970).
48 See note 46 supra.
49 Section 6 of the Export Permit Regulations, SOR154-200, 88 CANADA GAZETTE, pt. II, No. 12
(May 27, 1954), 2 STATUTORY ORDERS AND REGULATIONS 1221 (Consolidation, 1955), provides
for the issuance of "General Export Permits" authorizing the export of specified goods to all
destinations or to specified destinations.
50 The importance of export trade to Canada's well-being cannot be overemphasized. This is
because Canada has a relatively small population (approximately 21 million people), and so special-
ization and economics of scale can only be obtained through the development of world markets
by export trade. Thus, Canada, despite its small population, is the fourth largest trading country
in the world, and one out of every five Canadian workers is employed in export-connected industry
or trade. See CANADIAN AMERICAN COMMITTEE, A NEw TRADE STRATEGY FOR CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES (1957). See also B. WILKINSON, CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE: AN ANAL-
YSIS OF RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS (1968).
51 COCOM is formally known as the International Coordinating Committee on Strategic Trade
with Communist Countries. It was formed in 1949 by the United States and her Western allies
to coordinate a trade embargo against European communist countries other than Yugoslavia.
In 1950, the embargo was extended to China. To this end, COCOM maintains unpublished
lists of strategic goods designated as the minimum restraints to be exercised by participating
countries. These countries today include Japan and all NATO members except Iceland. For a
discussion of COCOM and the China embargo, see Garson, The American Trade Embargo Against Chi-
na, in CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POLICY 60-66 (A. Eckstein ed. 1971).
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not come from Canada's own export controls; rather they originated in the
extraterritorial application of United States foreign trade regulations. 52 One
such obstacle was created in the U.S. Export Control Act of 1949"a and its
successor, the Export Administration Act of 1969. 5 4 These Acts, and the Export
Control Regulations promulgated thereunder, 5 5 prohibited exports to China
of all commodities and unpublished technical data of U.S. origin without a
validated license. These restrictions applied not only to exports from the
United States but also to all re-exports from a foreign destination, including
Canada. For over two decades, with very few exceptions, no validated licenses
were issued. While Canada maintains only the minimum trade controls pre-
scribed by COCOM, all Canadian exports to China which involved end-products
made of U.S.-origin parts and components or which were manufactured by
using restricted U.S. technology, as well as all re-exports of U.S.-origin goods,
were effectively blocked by the United States export controls.5 6 This was true
regardless of whether the export was by a Canadian-owned or a U.S.-controlled
company, or whether the exports were considered strategic trade according
to Canadian law.57
In the case of Canada's export trade with China, the worst type of legal re-
straints originating from the United States were created not by the Export
Control Act, but by the Foreign Assets Control Regulations58 promulgated
under the authority of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1919.59 Basically,
these regulations prohibited all resident Americans and all U.S.-controlled
subsidiary companies abroad from trading with China (and North Korea and
North Vietnam as well) regardless of the origin of the goods involved. 60 In
effect, therefore, all trade between China and U.S.-owned or controlled com-
52 Comprehensive accounts of the U.S. embargo against China may be found in Berman
& Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 791 (1967);
Garson, The American Trade Embargo Against China, in CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POUcY 3(A. Eckstein ed. 1971); Lee & McCobb, United States Trade Embargo on China, 1949-70: Legal Status
and Future Prospects, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L & POL. 1 (1971); Sommerfield, Treasury Regulations Af-
fecting Trade With the Sino-Soviet Bloc and Cuba, 19 Bus. LAW. 861 (1964).
'3 Act of Feb. 26, 1949, ch. 1, § 1-12, 63 Stat. 7 (expired 1969).
" 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-13 (1970). For a discussion of the Act, see Berman, The Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1969: Analysis and Appraisal, AM. REv. EAST-WEsT TRADE, Jan. 1970, at 19.
5 13 C.F.R. pts. 368-99 (1972).
5 An offender, even a non-resident alien, was subject to criminal sanctions and civil penalties.
See Act of Feb. 26, 1949, ch. 1, §§ 1-12, 63 Stat. 7 (expired 1969). See also Export Administration
Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2406 (1970). More important than these penalties were the administrative
sanctions of warning letters and denial of export privileges available to the U.S. Department
of Commerce. Considering the importance of the United States in Canada's international trade,
the threat of a cut-off of trade with all American firms was sufficient to deter Canadian traders
from violating the U.S. embargo.
" In fact, under the Canadian Transshipment Regulations, SOR/55-3, 89 CANADA GAZETTE, Pt,
II, No. S-1 (Jan. 4, 1955), 2 STATUTORY ORDERS AND REGULATIONS 1243 (Consolidation, 1955),
§ 2; and the Export Control List, SOR/70-502, 104 CANADA GAZETTE, pt. I, No. 23, at 1344, 1391(Nov. 17, 1970), re-exports and transshipments from Canada to Area Control List Countries, if
they involve goods that originate outside Canada and have not been further manufactured or
processed in Canada so as to result in substantial change in value or nature, all require export
permits. And the Canadian government, in administering these regulations, has routinely refused
to issue export permits if the goods in question contain considerable American content.
58 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1972).
9 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44 (1970).
60 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201(b) & (d), 500.329(a) (1967).
SINO-CANADIAN TRADE
panies in Canada was subject to a virtually complete embargo.
Indeed, during the 1950's and 1960's the only Canadian exports to China
not adversely affected by the American embargo were goods produced by
non-U.S.-controlled companies, manufactured without use of U.S.-restricted
technology, containing no U.S.-made components, and sold by non-U.S.-
controlled companies.61 Even in industries such as agriculture, where U.S. con-
trol was minimal, trade with China was occasionally hindered by American
interference. 62 In fact, it was reported that some Canadian-owned companies
voluntarily refrained from even legally permissible dealings with the Chinese
for fear of jeopardizing their trading opportunities in the United States. 63
Although it is impossible to estimate the extent to which Sino-Canadian trade
was hampered by the American embargo against China, the close ties between
the two North American economies make it clear that the U.S. export controls
had a greater impact on Canada than on any other country during the past
two decades.
The American embargo was not the only barrier to Sino-Canadian trade,
however. An additional complication was China's own reaction to the American
trade controls. Throughout the 1960's, the Chinese showed constant reluctance
to trade with U.S.-controlled subsidiaries in Canada. In fact, as late as 1971, two
years after the beginning of the Nixon thaw, the Chinese had not invited any
U.S. subsidiary in Canada to attend the Canton Trade Fair, nor had they ex-
pressed any interest in purchasing Canadian products made of U.S.-origin
components. This attitude greatly worried Canadian trade officials because,
with the exception of agricultural commodities, wood, ferrous metals, semi-
manufactured products, and communication equipment, most of the goods
the Chinese might otherwise be interested in buying from Canada were pro-
duced in industries largely controlled by American firms.6 4
These obstacles to Sino-Canadian trade diminished gradually during 1972
61 Because of the confidential nature of business dealings, it is impossible to identify all Cana-
dian sales and potential sales to China effectively blocked by the Foreign Assets Control Regulations.
Some instances have, nevertheless, made headlines. In 1957, the Ford Motor Company in the
United States prohibited its Canadian subsidiary to consider a Chinese order of 1,000 trucks. See
1 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Can.) 403 (1958) (speech of Mr. Hazen Argue, M.P.). In the following year,
the Aluminum Company of Canada, Ltd. (Alcan), a Canadian corporation owned and controlled
in the United States refused to accept a million dollar Chinese order because of the fear of possible
violation of the U.S. Foreign Assets Control Regulations. See 1 PAiuL. DEB., H.C. (Can.) 544 (1959)
(speech of Mr. Argue). The Canadian public was disturbed by these events. An excellent discussion
on the extraterritoriality of U.S. export controls in Canada may be found in Corcoran, The Trading
With the Enemy Act and the Controlled Canadian Corporation, 14 McGILL L.J. 174 (1968). See also M.
WATKINS, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRIES 407-10 (Report of
the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, 1968).
62 For example, when Canada began to sell large amounts of wheat to China in 1961, the United
States threatened to withhold special loading equipment which could be supplied only by an
American subsidiary company in Canada. In addition, for some years the U.S. Government
complained to Canada about the easy credit the Canadian Wheat Board extended to the Chinese
for their wheat purchases. See H. ALBINSKI, AUSTRALIAN POLICIES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA
294 (1965); P. LYON, CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1961-1963, at 424, 494 (1968).
63 See Financial Post, July 5, 1958, at 1, col. 6.
64 During his visit to Peking in July, 1971, the Honorable Jean-Luc Pdpin, the Canadian Minister
of Trade, spent a substantial amount of time discussing this issue with the Chinese. The outcome
was that the Chinese agreed to look at the difficulty "on a case-by-case basis." See N.Y. Times,
July 7, 1971, at 3, col. 5.
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following the relaxation of the U.S. embargo against China. After having in-
stituted a series of decontrol measures,6 5 the United States Government
finally liberalized both the Export Control Regulations6 and the Foreign
Assets Control Regulations67 on February 16, 1972, to reduce the China em-
bargo to the level of restrictions imposed upon the Soviet bloc countries. The
effect of this change was to make available to China all commodities now avail-
able under general license to the communist countries of Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union, and to permit American-controlled subsidiaries abroad
to ship merchandise to China where such shipment is authorized by the host
country even if the goods in question could not be exported directly from the
United States under the Export Control Regulations.
As is well known, the Chinese responded favorably to the U.S. Government's
friendly gesture. In the same month that President Nixon returned from his
historic visit to Peking, many U.S. subsidiaries in Canada were invited by the
Chinese to the Canton Trade Fair. By the fall of the same year, the assertion
that U.S. subsidiaries in Canada were disadvantaged in China trade was finally
laid to rest by the events at the Canadian Trade Exhibition in, Peking. Among
the more than two hundred Canadian companies represented at the Exhibition,
forty were U.S.-controlled. Furthermore, a number of these companies re-
turned to Canada with substantial contracts.6 8 Today, a Canadian company,
whether American-controlled or Canadian-owned, may trade with the Chinese,
subject only to Canada's controls on strategic trade, free of U.S. institutional
restraints (such as a Commodity Control List considerably longer than Canada's
Export Control List).69 A major source of aggravation between Canada and
the United States has thus been removed.
Unlike the export controls, the United States embargo on imports of goods
originating from China had little impact on Canada, even before the recent
Nixon thaw.70 This is because Canadian imports from China in recent years have
been dominated by foodstuffs, textiles, and other light industrial goods,71
65 For a step-by-step account of the recent liberalization of U.S. embargo on China trade,
see Note, Recent Changes in United States Trade Regulations Affecting the People's Republic of China:
A Market Decontrolled. 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 98 (1972).
66 37 Fed. Reg. 3511 (1972).67 Id. at 3520.
6' The Chinese even allowed among the exhibitors Dow Chemical of Canada, Ltd., whose U.S.
parent manufactures napalm. See Schreiner, Year of the Bull for China Trade, Financial Post, May
6, 1972, at 1, col. 2. The most lucrative contract signed at the Fair was the $250,000 deal secured
by R.C.A. (Canada), Ltd., for components to be installed in the ground satellite stations the Chinese
have bought from the U.S. parent company for installation in Peking and Shanghai. See Burns,
Canada's Trade Fair at Peking Believed Well Worth Cost, Toronto Globe and Mail, Sept. 8, 1972,
§ B, at 1, col. 3.
69 The U.S. Commodity Control List is printed in 15 C.F.R. § 370.2(a)(13) (1972). Canada's
Export Control List is in SOR/70-502, 104 CANADA GAZETTE, pt. II, No. 23, at 1344 (Nov. 17, 1970).
"I Since the U.S. Foreign Assets Control Regulations were amended on December 22, 1969,
American-controlled business enterprises abroad have been authorized to deal in merchandise
originating in China and to engage in financial transactions with the Chinese. See 31 C.F.R. §
500.541 (1970). On June 10, 1971, the same regulations were further amended by the addition
of section 500.547, which permits the import into the United States of all goods of Chinese origin.
Thus, Canadian companies, American-controlled or locally-owned, may now re-export such goods
into the United States.
71 DOMINION BuREAu OF STATIsTIcs, EXPORTS BY COMMODITIES (various years).
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and very few U.S.-controlled Canadian subsidiaries which were subject to
the jurisdiction of the U.S. Foreign Assets Control Regulations were engaged
in such importation. 72 Therefore, the legal constraints on Canada's imports
from China stem mainly from Canada's internal law. These constraints in-
clude customs tariff, anti-dumping, quota, consumer protection, and health
or safety provisions.
One barrier which Chinese exports to Canada have had to surmount is
that of regular tariffs. As discussed earlier, Chinese commodities enjoy MFN
tariffs in Canada, but difficulties may still arise because of Canada's valuation
practice. In valuing imports for duty, Canada has traditionally used the fair
market value of the imported goods in the exporter's country (the so-called
home market value).7 3 Since China is a state trading country with a centrally
controlled economy, it is not possible to know the home market value of goods
originating there. Thus, following section 30 of the Customs Act, Chinese
imports have been valued at the discretion of the Minister of National Revenue.
7 4
The method used by the Minister appears quite uncertain at times, and is
often believed to be arbitrary. In some cases, the value for duty of British goods
has been used in valuing imports from China.75 In other cases-especially prior
to 1964, when the textile industry was alarmed about an increase in Chinese
textile imports-the Minister of National Revenue resorted to the simple and
expedient use of U.S. prices for customs valuation in order to restrict Chinese
imports.76 In more recent years, however, the Department of National Revenue
has used prices from Japan and Hong Kong as "normal" values for customs
purposes. 77 The problem of overvaluation of dutiable Chinese imports has thus
subsided.
Anti-dumping is not likely to be a significant obstacle to Canada's imports
from China. China is known to have practiced dumping in other countries;
78
and before the mid-1960's, most Chinese exports to Canada could technically
be considered dumping because the import prices of these goods were fre-
quently lower than the value for duty as determined by the Canadian author-
ities.79 But no formal complaint of Chinese dumping in Canada has been
72 For a summary of information on U.S. control in selected industries relevant to Sino-
Canadian trade, see S.P.S. Ho & R. W. HUENEMANN, supra note 5, at 22-23, table 11.
73 The rules for ascertaining and constructing the home market value are set out in sections
36 and 37 of the Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-58 (1970).
74 Under section 39(a), the Minister is authorized to prescribe the manner of determination
of duty in any case or class where it "cannot be determined under section 36 or 37 for the reason
that like or similar goods are not sold in the country of export or are not sold in such country in
the circumstances described in those sections." The ministerial prescription has been held by the
Tariff Board to be non-appealable. See H. Bedos & Co. (Can.), Inc. v. Deputy Minister of National
Revenue, 2 Tariff Board Reports 264 (1962).
75 For example, in H. Bedos & Co. (Can.), Inc. v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue, 2
Tariff Board Reports 264 (1962), the Tariff Board upheld a ministerial prescription providing
that paint brushes imported from China should have their value for duty determined on the basis
of the value of similar brushes of United Kingdom origin.
76 See 1 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Can.) 520 (1959) (statement by Hon. George C. Nowlan, Minister
of National Revenue). See also Financial Post, Aug. 10, 1953, at 2, col. 1.
77 S.P.S. Ho & R. W. HUENEMANN, supra note 5, at 43 n.79.78 See Wilczynski, Dumping and Central Planning, 74 J. POL. ECON. 250, 256 (1966).
79 There is a dumping if the export or actual selling price to an importer is less than the duty
for value or the normal value of the goods. See Customs Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 58, § 6(1) (1952);
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raised,80 perhaps because of the small size of Chinese exports to Canada. Such
exports constitute only a tiny fraction of Canada's domestic markets and are
thus unlikely to cause injury to Canadian production."'
Among Canada's non-tariff barriers to trade, the use of quota restrictions
(predominantly on textiles) may prove to be one of the most significant de-
terrents to the future expansion of Sino-Canadian trade. Although textiles
have been China's chief export to Canada, China's share of Canada's textile
imports has remained very small.82 Despite this fact, Chinese textiles have
generated concern and countermeasures in Canada. Thus, since 1963 the
Chinese have been asked to sign Voluntary Export Restraint agreements
(voluntary quotas) quantitatively restricting such imports.83  Moreover,
under the authorization of the Textile and Clothing Board Act of 1971, the
Canadian government has imposed mandatory quotas on several types of
textiles and clothing imports from all sources, including China.8 4
In the past, Canada's actual use of import quotas was relatively unimportant
to China trade because Chinese exports to Canada either remained below
or right at quota levels.8 5 In the future, however, faced with chronic deficits
in trade with Canada and the need to enlarge foreign currency earnings abroad
in order to pay for its increasing imports of modern technological products,
Anti-Dumping Act, CAN. REV. STAT. C. A-15, § 8 (1970).
80 See Grey, The Development of the Canadian Anti-Dumping System, in CANADIAN ANTI-DUMPING
CASES, app. E (1973).
81 Under Canada's old legislation, an anti-dumping duty would be imposed only when the
dumped goods constituted ten _per cent or more of the Canadian market, whereas the new Anti-
Dumping Act requires an explicit finding of "material injury" to Canada's domestic production.
See Customs Act, CAN. REV. STAT. C. 58, § 6 (1952); General Regulations Under Section 6 of the
Customs Act, Order in Council P.C. 1618, July 2, 1956 (Memorandum D51); Anti-Dumping
Act, CAN. REV. STAT. C. A-15, §§ 3-5 (1970). Among China's chief exports to Canada, such as
textiles, specialty foodstuffs, household utensils, and footwear, it is the textiles category which might
threaten to cause injury to Canadian production. However, as will be discussed infra, Canada's
textile industry is protected from foreign competition by quota restrictions on imports. For China's
chief exports to Canada, see DOMINION BUREAU OF STATISTICS, IMPORT BY COMMODITIES (various
years).
82 For example, in 1969 Canada imported about $570 million worth of textiles from all sources,
of which about $11.9 million came from China (about 2.1 per cent of the total). In 1970 China's
share fell to about 1.5 per cent. See DOMINION BUREAU OF STATISTICS, IMPORT BY COUNTRIES (1970).
83 See Office of Special Import Policy, Dep't of Industry, Trade, and Commerce, Restraint
Arrangements (mimeo, 1973). See also K. STEGEMANN, CANADIAN NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE
12-13, table 1 (Voluntary Export Restraint Agreements Between Canada and Seventeen Exporting
Countries, Jan. 1971) (1972).
84 The Textile and Clothing Board Act, CAN. STAT. c. 39 (1971), has authorized the government
to make additions to the so-called "Import Control List." Products on this list are subject to import
licensing in accordance with the provisions of the Export and Import Permits Act, CAN. REV.
STAT. c. E-17, as amended (1970). Until August, 1971, the Import Control List contained mainly
dairy products, coffee, and sugar, which are not among China's chief exports to Canada. See
SOR/70-359, 104 CANADA GAZETTE, pt. II, No. 16, at 873 (July 31, 1970). Since then, cotton yarn
and men's and boys' shirts have been added to the list. See SOR/71-441, 105 CANADA GAZETTE, pt.
II, No. 17, at 1425 (Aug. 26, 1971); SOR/71-539, 105 CANADA GAZETTE, pt. II, No. 17, at 1816
(Oct. 19, 1971). Imports of the former item from China are, however, authorized by a general per-
mit. See General Import Permit No. 4, SOR/71-486, 105 CANADA GAZETTE, pt. II, No. 19, at 1701
(Oct. 1, 1971). The quota of shirts from all sources is expected to be removed by November 30,
1974. See Dep't of Industry, Trade, and Commerce, News Release No. 2174 (1973).
85 S.P.S. Ho & R. W. HUENEMANN, supra note 5, at 48, table 15 (Canadian Quota Limits and
Actual Chinese Exports, Selected Textile Products, 1966-70).
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the Chinese are expected to press hard for larger textile exports to Canada.
Canada therefore will either have to accommodate the Chinese demands or
face the prospect of a slow-down in China's imports from Canada.
The remaining legal restrictions relevant to imports from China generally
involve consumer protection measures designed to protect health and safety.
They include the Canada Agricultural Products Standards Act,8 6 the
Meat Inspection Act,8 7 the Hazardous Products Act,8 8 the Textile Labelling
Act,8 9 and the Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act.90 These acts provide
the basis for comprehensive inspection requirements and restrictions applicable
to the importation of animals and animal products that might transmit
diseases of livestock or poultry, the importation and sale of potentially hazardous
substances, and the labelling of consumer goods. Since China is a newcomer
in the field of foreign trade, these consumer protection measures will continue
to give rise to a large number of minor difficulties in Sino-Canadian trade until
the P.R.C. manages to familiarize itself with this maze of complex legislation.9 1
III
CONTRACTING PRACTICES
To date, all of Canada's business deals with the Chinese have been con-
ducted in the form of straight sales, although it is possible that licensing agree-
ments will be used in the future. No direct foreign investment in any form
is likely to be admitted in China, as it is in the Eastern European countries.9 2
In sales transactions with China, Canadian trading agencies have not been
used extensively. The Chinese prefer to deal directly with Canadian producers
or end-users whenever possible,93 despite the fact that the Chinese state trading
corporations are themselves simply middlemen between domestic producers
or users and foreign traders. When middlemen are involved, the Chinese tend
to shy away from exclusive dealing arrangements, although a few large Cana-
dian trading companies have been granted exclusive rights because of the
perceived value of volume orders and long-term business relationships.9 4
86 CAN. Rv. STAT. C. A-8 (1970).87 Id. c. M-7.
88 Id. c. H-3.
19 Id., 1st Supp., c. 46.
90 CAN. STAT. C. 41 (1970-72).
91 See generally IMPORTERS' BULL., Dec. 5, 1973.
9 2 The fear of foreign domination, derived from historical experience, is the reason behind this
attitude. See Li, Trade With China: A Cautionary Prospectus, in CHINA'S TRADE WITH THE WEST: A
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIc ANALYSIS 209, 222 (A. Stahnke ed. 1972).
'3 An interesting example was found during the 1972 spring Canton Trade Fair when a large
consortium attending the Fair was given a trade discount by a state trading corporation because in
this instance the Chinese felt they were dealing with a principal and not an agent. See CHINA TRADE
REPORT, Apr. 1972, at 5.
14 This information is based on an interview with an experienced Canadian importer. It was
reported that the Chinese refusal to grant exclusivity to certain established buyers to deal in Chinese
handicrafts had resulted in a glut on the market in Europe, where supply exceeded demand.
See Toronto Globe and Mail, Oct. 16, 1972, at 15, col. 3. Faced with a complaint about similar
problems in Canada, a Chinese trade official agreed to make "further study and investigation."
See id., Dec. 12, 1973, § B, at 2, col. 2.
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The commercial transactions generally take the form of short-term con-
tracts either concluded by correspondence or made at the Canton Trade Fair
once or twice a year depending upon whether the contracts cover the demand
for a whole year or for only a six-month period. The major exception to this
practice is wheat sales. In wheat sales, the Canadian Wheat Board, which is
a Crown agency controlling Canada's wheat exports, does not participate in
the Canton Fair. It deals directly with the relevant Chinese state trading cor-
poration (that is, the China National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and
Export Corporation) in either Peking or Ottawa.9 5 Except during the period
between 1969 and 1972 when one-year contracts were used, all of Canada's
wheat sales to China since 1961 have been made under three-year agreements.,"
Since a long-term wheat agreement is simply a memorandum of intent,97 the
actual sales are carried out by a second contract negotiated every six months.
It is in this contract that the specific terms and conditions of the sale are
stipulated.9 8
Individual contracts are of particular importance in Sino-Canadian trade
because China does not have an agreement on uniform conditions of trade
and delivery with Canada. Unlike Western businessmen, who frequently make
contracts orally and accept commercial invoices, bills of lading, and sales re-
ceipts as evidence of contractual obligations, the Chinese always require a
formal written contract for each transaction. These contracts are usually longer
and more detailed than those used by Canadian firms for comparable deals
with other Western countries. The form and content of individual contracts,
of course, differ in accordance with the nature of the transactions involved.
However, except for major transactions, such as the Canadian sales of wheat
and satellite communications equipment, the Chinese state trading corporations
always insist upon using their standard form contract for both import and
export transactions.99
There are striking differences between the terms of the Chinese standard
contracts of purchase and sale; those differences are invariably favorable
to them in providing ample protection for the Chinese state trading cor-
porations. Of course, the addition of new terms or the deletion or alteration
of standard terms can be negotiated, and it may be possible to obtain more
favorable terms after business relations have been established and Chinese
confidence in the foreign trader has been created. 100 In most cases, however,
95 Before Canada recognized China in 1970 such negotiations were usually held in Hong Kong.
" In the near future long-term agreements in other product areas, for example aluminum and
woodpulp, also appear likely. See note 4supra. In fact, as noted earlier, Canada and China mutually
pledged in the recent Trade Agreement to "facilitate the development of... long-term commercial
agreements between the relevant trading bodies and enterprises of the two countries." Trade
Agreement Between Canada and the People's Republic of China, art. 6 (mimeo, Oct. 13, 1973).
'7 In a typical long-term wheat agreement, the Chinese party declares its intent to buy, and the
Canadian Wheat Board its intent to supply, certain quantities of wheat over a three-year period.
The quantities specified are usually a minimum and maximum.
98 For the Canadian Wheat Board's experience in wheat sales to China, see Kristjanson,
Problems and Prospects of Canadian Wheat Sales to China and Russia, 49 J. FARM EcON. 1345 (1967).
99 Out of well over two dozen non-major contracts seen by this author, only one, dated 1958,
was actually drafted by a Canadian businessman who, for that matter, had relied on his own trading
experience with the Russians.100 A Canadian exporter informed the author that in one instance he was able to persuade
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Canadian traders have often found it difficult to avoid accepting the Chinese
standard terms. As the Chinese negotiators are government officials who are
more bureaucrats than businessmen, they tend to be rather rigid in adhering
to fixed terms.
As a rule, each contract will contain the commodity name, quantity, specifi-
cations, country of origin and manufacture (when the Chinese are the buyers),
total value, packing, shipping marks, shipping time, the loading port, and so
forth. These business terms are, of course, different in each individual contract.
Other important contract terms and conditions which are common in Sino-
Canadian trade are discussed below.
A. Price Quotation
Contract unit price terms are usually quoted on an f.o.b. (free on board),
c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight), or c. & f. (cost and freight) basis. Chinese
imports from Canada are almost always f.o.b. the Canadian port. The Canadian
exporter is generally responsible for delivery of the goods on board a Chinese-
owned or chartered vessel at the port of shipment specified in the contract
and usually assumes all risks and costs until delivery is made. Freight is paid
and insurance arranged for by the Chinese buyer. Chinese exports to Canada
are generally c.i.f. the Canadian port with the Chinese seller assuming respon-
sibility for chartering a vessel or space on a vessel, paying freight costs and
insurance, and bearing all risks until the goods are delivered at the Canadian
port within a specified time.
The reasons for the Chinese preference for buying f.o.b. and for selling
c.i.f. are not difficult to understand. With the existence of a state insurance
company, as well as a large fleet of chartered vessels and a growing number of
their own, it is natural that the Chinese desire to keep for themselves the profit-
able business of insurance and shipping.' 0a Occasionally, however, a c. & f.
contract of sale may be obtained from the Chinese. Under such a contract,
the Chinese state trading corporation is responsible for shipping the goods
to the Canadian port of destination, while the Canadian importer may purchase
his own insurance.1 0 2
B. Credit and Payment Terms
With few exceptions, Sino-Canadian trade dealings are transacted in cash.
Since 1968, the Chinese have refused to extend any credit to Canadian im-
his Chinese counterparts to strike out a penalty clause contained in a standard form contract
for purchase. According to his account, he was able to do so only because of the friendship and
mutual trust he had established with them through many years of dealings.
101 Insurance is handled either by the People's Insurance Company of China or its affiliate,
the China Insurance Company, Ltd. Both companies have agents in Canada for processing claims
and other matters relating to insurance. Shipping for both import and export is the responsibility
of the China National Chartering Corporation. See DEP'T OF INDUSTRY, TRADE, AND COMMERCE,
MARKETS FOR CANADIAN EXPORTERS-CHINA 14 (1971).
102 In one instance of which this writer is aware a Canadian importer was able to buy c. & f.
and to purchase his own insurance because the Chinese refused to sell him an insurance policy
covering S.R.C.C. (i.e., strike, riot, and civil commotion) which he required. There was a similar
report emanating from the 1972 spring Canton Fair. See CHINA TRADE REPORT, Apr. 1972, at 5.
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porters.1 0 3 This has certainly reduced Chinese sales to Canada. Presumably the
Chinese have been able to sell all they can produce for export. When their pro-
duction exceeds their present requirements for foreign exchange, they may
reconsider credit or time payment.1 4 Thus far, the Chinese have also refused to
accept credits from Canada, with the exception of the wheat trade which calls
for the extension of short-term credits from the Canadian Wheat Board guar-
anteed by the government of Canada. 10 5 Apparently, the current Chinese
leadership is determined to keep the country's dependency on the outside
world at a bare minimum. However, as China's industrial needs increase and
outside relations improve, it is not unlikely that China might seek, in the near
future, medium and long-term credits from Canada for the equipment and
technology it would like to buy.10 6
All payments are made by irrevocable letters of credit through the Bank
of China (China's foreign exchange bank) and the Canadian chartered banks
which have a correspondent relationship with the Bank of China. 07 A com-
parison of the differences in payment terms would show that, as a rule, when
the Chinese are the sellers, the letters of credit opened by the Canadian im-
porters must not only be confirmed, divisible, assignable, and without recourse,
but also must be payable as soon as the Chinese present the shipping documents
in China to the Bank of China. On the other hand, when the Chinese are the
buyers, their letters of credit are not confirmed and are not payable until
the Canadian exporters have sent their shipping documents through a Cana-
dian bank to the Bank of China in Peking, and sometimes not even until the
goods have arrived and been inspected and approved.1 0, Thus, Canadian
exporters are faced with a short period between the dispatch of shipping docu-
ments and the receipt of payment by the Bank of China in Peking when they
103 Before 1968 there were occasions when the Chinese appeared to be willing to extend
D/P (documents against payment) and 90-day terms, and even to ship on consignment. See Thomson,
Selling to Communist China, FoREIGN TRADE, Apr. 18, 1964, at 22, 25.
104 See Endicott, Canada-China Trade and Political Considerations, 3 PACIFIC COMMUNITY 672,
681-82 (1971).
105 The terms of the contract are a down payment of 25 per cent cash, the balance payable in
18 months with 6 per cent interest.
106 An eighth state trading corporation, called the China National Technological Import
Corporation, was established in the fall of 1972. The corporation is responsible for importation
of complete plants, technology, and technological exchanges. The expansion of Sino-Canadian
business relations to this area would certainly require sizeable Canadian export credits.
107 As of 1973, five Canadian banks (the Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Montreal, the Cana-
dian Imperial Bank of Commerce, the Bank of British Columbia, and the Bank of Nova Scotia) have
made correspondence agreements with the Bank of China. Under the agreements, the five Cana-
dian banks have opened Ren Min Bi accounts with the Bank of China in Peking, while the latter
has maintained Canadian dollar accounts and, more recently, U.S. dollar accounts, with the former
in Canada.
108 The following payment clauses, taken from the selling and the purchasing contracts of the
China National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation, provide a good
example. When the Corporation is the seller, the payment clause states:
The Buyers shall establish through a bank acceptable to the Sellers a confirmed, irrevocable,
assignable, divisible Letter of Credit... for the total value of the goods.., allowing
__ % more or less both in amount and quantity at Sellers' option in favor of [the Sel-
lers] payable/negotiable at sight against first presentation of shipping documents.
When the Chinese state corporation is the _purchaser, the clause sometimes reads: "Payment
against irrevocable. 96% Letter of Credit of contract value, established through the Bank of China,
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have no control of the cargo and documents. However, as in their other busi-
ness dealings, the Chinese have never failed to honor their credits. Occasionally
Canadian exporters are able to persuade the Chinese to negotiate the docu-
ments in a London or Hong Kong branch of the Bank of China, in which case
the exporters can retain control of the documents through their banks in Lon-
don or Hong Kong until payment is assured. Of course, all of this is a question
of bargaining power. An alternative protection for Canadian exporters may
be the purchase of export credits insurance from either private sources or
the Export Development Corporation.0 9
Under the Sino-Canadian Trade Agreement, trade transactions are to be
settled in Canadian dollars, Chinese Ren Min Bi (RMB), or in other mutually
acceptable freely convertible currencies.110 In practice, however, until 1968 all
dealings between Canada and China were conducted in pounds sterling.1 1
Since then, an increasing number of letters of credit have been negotiated
in Canadian dollars. In mid-1969, the Chinese introduced Ren Min Bi into
transactions, and as a result Canadian exporters have often been asked to
quote prices in that currency. At the Canton Fair the following spring the
Chinese served notice that, whenevei- possible, all future business was to be
transacted in RMB. 1 2 These steps were taken essentially because of the de-
valuation of the pound sterling in 1967 and the continuing uncertainty of
all major currencies." 3
The Chinese attempt to use RMB as an international currency has had only
limited success in Canada. At the present time, although RMB, Canadian dol-
lars, and sterling are being used equally in Canadian imports, the Chinese
currency is rarely used in Canadian export quotations.1 4 The main stumbling
payable on presentation of documents, 4% balance to be paid. within - days after discharge
of goods if results of reinspection are in conformity with the stipulations of the order." A purchasing
contract of another state trading corporation the author has seen is even tougher. It states that
"[all] payment [is] to be made... within 30 days on arrival of the goods at Buyer's warehouse
... and after Buyer's inspection and approval."
109 For a discussion of the Export Development Corporation's export credits insurance program,
see Chen, Canadian Export Credits, Guarantee and Insurance Programs, in STUDIES IN CANADIAN Busi-
NESS LAw 368, 371-81 (G. Fridman ed. 1971).
110 Trade Agreement Between Canada and the People's Republic of China, art. 5 (mimeo,
Oct. 13, 1973).
11 Until recently U.S. dollars were not used in Sino-Canadian transactions because of the United
States trade embargo against China which froze the dollar for use in trade with China. However,
revisions of the U.S. Foreign Assets Control Regulations, effective in May of 1971, made it possible
for U.S. dollars to be used in China trade. See 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 567-68 (1971). It was not
until early 1973, however, that China actually accepted U.S. currency in trade transactions with
Canada.
"' See Toronto Globe and Mail, Sept. 9, 1970, at 31, col. 4.
113 In order to facilitate the increased use of RMB, and to overcome the resistance of Canadian
businessmen who prefer to deal in Canadian dollars or pounds sterling, the Chinese set a fixed
exchange rate for the RMB, pegging it to the pound sterling. The Bank of China will sell RMB at
the fixed exchange rate to its correspondent banks in Canada to cover payment of imports from
China, and purchase from them spot RMB at the same rate in respect of proceeds of exports to
China, provided evidence of a commercial contract concluded in RMB with China is shown.
In addition, the Bank of China will sell and purchase "forward" RMB for a period of up to six
months to cover imports from and exports to China respectively. These arrangements are contained
in a letter from the London Branch of the Bank of China to its Canadian correspondents, September
29, 1970.
114 According to the International Banking Office of the Bank of Montreal, since early 1973
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block is the continuing nonconvertibility of RMB in spite of its introduction
into international banking transactions.' 1 5 In addition, all "forward" sales
and purchases of RMB are actually effected through the Bank of China's
London branch, which continues to quote in pounds sterling. The Canadian
traders who contract in RMB must therefore calculate the double variable
of the Canadian dollar and sterling.
C. Warranty Clause and Commodity Inspection
With regard to warranties of goods, there is again a striking difference
between China's export and import contracts. Where the Chinese trading cor-
poration is the buyer, the standard form contract usually places great emphasis
on the warranty clause which stipulates that the seller guarantees the quantity,
quality, specifications, and technical condition of the goods. This guarantee
extends for a fixed period after the arrival of the goods at the port of destina-
tion or after acceptance of the goods.' 1 6 On the other hand, when China is
the seller, little may be said of the guarantees in the contract.'17 In view of
the fact that both Chinese and Canadian law recognize the concept of implied
warranties in the sale of goods, 1 8 and that warranties inferred by law are seldom
disclaimed by an exclusion clause, the lack of express warranties in most Chinese
sales contracts has not presented difficult problems for Canadian buyers.
A typical Chinese buying contract would further require that the seller pro-
duce certificates of quality and quantity or weight as regards the subject goods,
issued by the manufacturers or publicly-recognized surveyors.i 9 After arrival
U.S. dollars have also been used in a few Canadian export transactions with China.
"' China permits the sale and purchase of RMB only upon evidence of a signed commercial
contract concluded in RMB in order to guard against currency speculation.
u1 A buying contract of the China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation reads:
The seller shall guarantee that the commodity is made of the best materials, with first class
workmanship, brand new, unused and complies in all respects with the quality, specifications
and performance as stipulated in this contract. The seller shall guarantee that the goods,
when correctly mounted and properly operated and maintained shall give satisfactory
performance for a period of -months, counting from the date on which the com-
modity arrives at the port of destination.
Another contract of the same corporation says:
If prior to the completion of the warranty period of months after the date of final
acceptance of the .[name of commodity] any defect is discovered in
any part of the [name of commodity] which is proved to be due to defec-
tive material or workmanship, the sellers shall undertake to repair or at their option replace
the defective parts.
117 None of the Chinese export contracts the author has seen contain any warranty clause
expressly guaranteeing the quality of the goods.
11' There is no civil code in China. However, according to a Chinese official legal textbook,
it is the duty of the seller to guarantee that the goods delivered have no defects, except where the
defects could have been "easily discovered" by the buyer at the time the contract was made.
See INSTITUTE OF CIVIL LAW, CENTRAL POLITICAL-JUDICIAL CADRES' SCHOOL (PEKING), BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 222-23 (1959) (U.S. Joint
Publications Research Service, No. 4879, 1961). Similar implied warranties are set out in sections
13-16 of the Ontario Sale of Goods Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 421 (1970), and the acts of all other
provinces.
119 In the wheat agreements, such certificates are to be issued by the Canadian Grain Com-
misgion (formerly the Board of Grain Commissioners) pursuant to the Canada Grain Act, CAN.
STAT. c. 7 (1970-71). The Phyto-Sanitary Certificate issued by the Plant Protection Division of
the Canadian Department of Agriculture is also required.
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of the goods at the port of destination, the Chinese may apply to the China
Commodity Inspection Bureau for inspection, regarding certificates issued by
the Bureau as authoritative and final. 120 If any discrepancies are found by
the Bureau, the Chinese are entitled to one or a combination of the following
remedies: (1) rejection of the goods, (2) compensation for damages, (3) re-
placement of defective parts, and (4) special damages for expenses incurred.
Should delivery be delayed, a standard provision gives the Chinese the right to
claim damages, and in case of non-delivery, the right to cancel the con-
tract.1 21 Again, when the Chinese are the sellers, none of these rights are stip-
ulated in the contracts for the protection of foreign buyers.
D. Shipping Documents and Terms
When the Chinese are the buyers, the foreign exporters are always required
to provide detailed shipping and other documents. When the Chinese are
the sellers, however, reference to shipping documents is often vague, if not
omitted altogether.1 2 2 Furthermore, when the Chinese are the importers,
transshipment is specifically prohibited, whereas when they are the exporters,
120 On the power of the China Commodity Inspection Bureau, see Hsiao, Communist China's
Foreign Trade Organization, 20 VAND. L. REV. 303, 309-10 (1967).
121 See, e.g., the inspection and claims clause found in a standard form contract in which the
China National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation is the buyer. The
clause stipulates:
(1) Goods under this order are contracted on basis of landed quality and landed weight,
with certificate issued by the China Commodity Inspection Bureau as final. (2) The goods
purchased under this order shall be subject to the inspection by the China Commodity
Inspection Bureau at the port of destination. Should the quality, specifications, quantity
and/or weight be found not in conformity with the stipulations of the order, due to causes
other than those for which the Insurance Company or Shipping Company are liable, the
Buyers shall on the strength of the Survey Report issued by the aforesaid Bureau have the
right to reject the goods delivered and/or to file claim against the Sellers, with the survey
fees for the Sellers' account. The time for inspection and claim should be within days
after discharge of the goods. (3) If results of reinspection are not in conformity with the
stipulations of the order, the Buyers have the right to deduct their..claim from 4% balance
[unpaid by the Buyers]. In case amount claimed exceeds 4% balance, then the difference
is to be remitted by the Sellers. (4) In the event of the Sellers' failing to make delivery
effect shipment within the stipulated time, unless caused by Force Majeure as specified below,
the Buyers shall have the right to cancel the order and withdraw the Letter of Credit,
if opened, and in such case the Sellers shall reimburse the Buyers for all the losses and
expenses incurred directly attributable to the non-delivery/non-shipment.12 2 When the China National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation
is the buyer, a contract clause specifies in detail the documents required:
1. Full set of negotiable clean on board ocean bills of lading marked "freight payable at
destination" [i.e., when f.o.b. contract] or "freight prepaid" [i.e., when c.i.f. contract].
2. Signed invoice indicating order number. 3. Weight memo. 4. Quality certificate and weight
certificate issued by manufacturers or publidy-recognized surveyors. 5. Copy of cable
advice of shipment/dispatch. 6. Steamship company's scheduled itinerary evidencing
that the carrying vessel, prior to her arrival at the port of destination, shall not call at U.S.A.
ports and Taiwan. 7. A letter certifying that all the copies of the required documents havebeen sent to us by airmail. 8. Insurance policy or certificate. 9. Steamship company's letter
undertaking shipment to the destination without any transshipment. (Emphasis added.)
Compare the following clause, which is couched in vague and general terms. It is taken from a
standard form contract employed when the China National Light Industrial Products Import
and Export Corporation is the seller.
Immediately after the signing of this Contract or punctually as otherwise mutually agreed
upon, the Buyers shall establish the required Letter of Credit allowing transshipment and partial
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the shipping conditions always allow them transshipment and partial ship-
ment.
123
About fifty per cent of shipments from China to Canada are direct from
Chinese ports to Vancouver. 1 24 The remainder are transshipped from Hong
Kong, Rotterdam, or Kobe, Japan,'25 depending upon whether the goods
are destined for the east or west coast of Canada. The delay caused by trans-
shipment has deterred Canadian importers because of the lengthened turn-
over period for capital and the probable loss of sale in seasonal markets.
As previously mentioned, for both import and export the Chinese prefer
to handle shipping themselves in order to save hard currency. In China this
responsibility belongs to the Chinese National Chartering Corporation, which
maintains a large fleet of chartered vessels as well as a growing number of
its own to work between Chinese and Canadian ports. In the charter parties
concluded by the China National Chartering Corporation, a typical clause
stipulates that the vessels used shall not call at U.S. ports and shall not be in the
vicinity of Taiwan. 126 A similar clause can also be found in the rare c. & f. or
c.i.f. sales to China, when foreign traders assume responsibility for shipping.1 27
In view of the dramatic change in United States-Chinese relations from hos-
tility to normality, 28 and the easing of U.S. restrictions on American-owned
vessels which seek to call at Chinese ports, 129 the above-mentioned clause pro-
hibiting vessels used in China trade from visiting U.S. ports may be expected to
disappear from the Chinese standard form contracts soon.
E. Force Majeure
All Sino-Canadian trade contracts have force majeure clauses, though their
precise meaning is not always clear. Many of these clauses do not contain elab-
orate definition; 30 others provide that the sellers shall not be liable for non-
shipment in favor of the Sellers through the Bank of China, or their Correspondents, of a
first class Bank [whatever this may mean] who can authorize the negotiation in China
and will reimburse the PAYMENT AGAINST SHIPPING DOCUMENTS AT SIGHT.
The Buyers shall so arrange that the relative Letter of Credit will reach the Sellers with an
allowance of at least 4-8 weeks before the time of shipment designated. (Emphasis added.)
123 Id.
'
24 See Stark, An Analysis of the Foreign Trade Practices of the People's Republic of China Including
Comments on the Canadian Experience, 5 U.B.C.L. REv. 165, 182 (1970).
125 According to a Vancouver importer, transshipment at Kobe has created special problems
of delay. After the first carrying vessel from China discharges. goods at the Japanese port, the
shipment is frequently held up by Japanese shipping companies because they prefer to wait for
one of their own vessels rather than take the next available vessel to Vancouver.
126 One charter party stipulates that "when ordered for Shanghai or North China discharge,
vessel to proceed at least 60 miles east of Taiwan."
127 See the contract clause of the China National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and
Export Corporation, supra note 120.
128 In a joint communique dated February 22, 1973, the United States and China agreed
to establish a "liaison office" in each other's capital. Although the agreement does not establish
full diplomatic relations, it authorizes the creation of a diplomatic presence of unlimited size in
both capitals, with diplomatic immunity for the members of both missions, and "a concrete pro-
gram of expanding trade as well as scientific, cultural, and other exchanges." See N.Y. Times,
Feb. 23, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
129 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.538, 500.541; 36 Fed. Reg. 8584 (1971).
130 For example, the force majeure clause in a purchasing contract prepared by the China Metals
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delivery or delay caused by "war, flood, fire, storm, heavy snow, or other causes
beyond sellers' control."
13 1
Whether the term "other causes beyond sellers' control" found in the force
majeure clauses includes strikes and other labor disputes, is unclear from
the contracts. Experience shows, however, that whenever suggested by Cana-
dian negotiators, the Chinese have invariably refused to consider inclusion
of strikes in the language of the force majeure clauses. It would be altogether sur-
prising if a Marxist-Leninist who considers a strike as an inherent vice of the
capitalist system were willing to share the resulting loss with the capitalist
exporters.1 3
2
None of the force majeure clauses are explicit as to whether a change in
Chinese foreign trade plans or the cancellation of export or import licenses
by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade would excuse a Chinese state trading
corporation from contract obligations. Like Soviet law, 133 however, Chinese
law considers Chinese sellers' contractual obligations extinguished if the im-
possibility of performance is caused by a change of law or by a governmental
shift in economic planning.1 34 The same principle may not apply to exonerate
foreign sellers from legal impossibility for, in some contracts where the Chinese
are the buyers, the force majeure clauses stipulate that the "[foreign] sellers'
inability in obtaining export license shall not be considered as Force Majeure. ' 135
When force majeure is claimed, the Chinese generally insist on a clause re-
quiring the seller to notify the buyer immediately. Within a stipulated period
of time, the seller must provide the buyer with satisfactory proof of the cause
and nature of the circumstances of force majeure. Thus the contract obligation
will be altered accordingly and, in some cases, may be cancelled by the buyer.
1 36
and Minerals Import and Export Corporation simply states that "[iln case of Force Majeure
the Sellers shall not be held responsible for delay in delivery or non-delivery of the goods .. "
131 For example, a China Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation's
sales contract stipulates:
Should the Sellers fail to deliver the contracted goods or effect the shipment in time by
the reason of war, flood, fire, storm, heavy snow or any other causes beyond their control, the
time of shipment might be duly extended, or alternatively a part or whole of the contract
might be cancelled, but the Sellers have to furnish the Buyers with a certificate attesting
such event or events. (Emphasis added.)
"
32 See generally PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, TRADE WITH CHINA 69 (1971).
133 See Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in International Trade,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1436 (1963); Berman, Force Majeure and the Denial of an Export License
Under Soviet Law: A Comment on Jordan Investments Ltd. v. Soiuznefteksport, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1128
(1960); Domke, The Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 787 (1959). See also S. PISAR,
COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE: GUIDELINES FOR TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 274-79
(1970).
134 According to the Chinese Institute of Civil Law, "[i]nsofar as the obligation resulting from
a Chinese governmental planning document is concerned, the plan is the premise on which
the obligation is created, and the obligation, in turn, is a means to insure the fulfillment of the
plan. Therefore, when the planning document is rescinded, the obligation is also extinguished."
INSTITUTE OF CIVIL LAW, CENTRAL POLITICAL-JUDICIAL CADRES' SCHOOL (PEKING), BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 191 (1959) (U.S. Joint Publications Research
Service, No. 4879, 1961). See also Pfeffer, The Institution of Contracts in the Chinese People's Republic,
CHINA Q., July-Sept. 1963, at 115, 134-35.
3' The quotation is taken from a standard form contract in which the China National Metals
and Minerals Import and Export Corporation is the buyer.
136 For example, in a contract where the China National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import
and Export Corporation is the buyer, theforce majeure clause stipulates that:
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F. Penalty Clause
While the penalty clause is seldom found in contracts where the Chinese
are the sellers, it is the deterrent most favored by the Chinese as a means of
enforcing delivery when they are the buyers. For example, in a current contract
where the China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation is the
buyer, unless the excuse offorce majeure can be claimed, a penalty will be imposed
on the Canadian seller for delayed delivery at the rate of 0.5 per cent of the
value "for each of the first three months after... one month grace and 1.0
per cent per month thereafter." As in most contracts, a penalty ceiling of 5.0
per cent of the total value of the contract is stipulated.
It should be noted that the penalty clause employed in Chinese trade con-
tracts does not fall within the common law meaning of the term. Having been
borrowed from the Soviet experience, which is clearly different from the
common law, the penalty clause under Chinese law serves both deterrent and
quasi-compensatory functions. To a socialist society, a breach of contract
frequently results in a breach of the state plan. Punishment is, therefore, con-
sidered appropriate both to vindicate society's interest and to assure maximum
efforts in fulfillment of that interest. Where the obligee suffers damages less
than the amount of the penalty, the penalty itself is compensatory to the extent
of the damages. In the event the penalty amount does not cover the damages
suffered, the obligee can recover compensatory damages to make up the
difference. 137
G. Settlement of Commercial Disputes 138
In 1954 and 1958, respectively, China established the Foreign Trade
Arbitration Committee and the Maritime Arbitration Committee, under the
aegis of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, for the
purpose of settling foreign trade disputes by arbitration.1 3 9 However, because
of the traditional Chinese distaste for adjudication, the Chinese foreign trade
corporations prefer negotiation as a means of dispute settlement, reserving
arbitration only as the last resort.1 40 Thus, most Chinese foreign trade contracts
In case of delayed delivery/shipment due to force majeure such as war, serious flood, fire,
frost, ice or other natural calamities, the Sellers shall immediately advise the Buyers by
cable of the occurrence, and within 15 days thereafter airmail to the Buyers a certificate
evidencing such accident/incident to be approved by the Buyers. Under such circumstances,
the Sellers, however, are still under obligation to take all necessary measures to hasten
the delivery of the goods so delayed; in case the accident/incident lasts for more than eight
weeks, the Buyers shall have the right to cancel the Order.
13'7 For an analysis of the legal nature of penalty clauses in Chinese law, see Pfeffer, supra note
134, at 129-31.
138 See generally McCobb, Foreign Trade Arbitration in the People's Republic of China, 5 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 205 (1972). See also 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 126-35 (P. Sanders
ed. 1965).
139 For the structure and procedure of the Chinese arbitration organs, see Hsiao, Communist
China's Foreign Trade Organization, 20 VAND. L. REv. 303, 314-17 (1969); Hsiao, Communist China's
Foreign Trade Contracts and Means of Settling Disputes, 22 VAND. L. REv. 503, 511-18 (1969).
140 See Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1201 (1966);
Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dipute Resolution in Communist China. 55 CALIF. L. REV.
1284 (1967). See generally D. BODDE & C. MORRus, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1967).
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contain an arbitration clause, and where such a clause is included it always
commences: "Any dispute in connection with the execution of this contract
shall be settled through friendly negotiation. Failing such settlement all dis-
putes shall be submitted for arbitration. ' t '
When arbitration is to take place, there are several different types of clauses
with respect to the location of the hearing and to the rules of procedure ap-
plicable. The Chinese naturally prefer that arbitration take place in Peking
and that their own rules of procedure apply. Thus, in their contract negotiations
with foreign traders the Chinese have invariably proposed that disputes be
arbitrated by their arbitration organizations. It is generally conceded that the
Chinese arbitration procedures and awards are fair, and that their panels of
arbitrators (which are made up exclusively of Chinese nationals) are profes-
sionally competent. Yet very little is known to the outside world regarding
the procedure actually employed and the substantive law applied when
the arbitration takes place in Peking. 42 Moreover, the intimate interconnec-
tions of the Chinese arbitration organs with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
the state trading corporations cast some doubt on their impartiality.14 3 All
this explains the reluctance of many Canadian firms to accept arbitration in
China. In view of the bargaining leverage on the Chinese side, however, Cana-
dian companies frequently acquiesce to provisions for arbitration by the Chinese
organizations.14 4
As an alternative to arbitration in China by the Chinese arbitration organiza-
tions, the Chinese have sometimes agreed to a formula whereby arbitration may
take place in the country of the defendant. Thus, a sales contract of the China
National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation may
contain the following clause:
[Airbitration ... shall take place in the country where the defendant re-
sides. Each party shall appoint an arbitrator, the two arbitrators thus appointed
shall select a third person as chairman to form an arbitration committee. In
case the claim is made on the Chinese Party, the arbitration shall be held by the
Foreign Trade Arbitration Committee of the China Council for the Promotion
of International Trade in accordance with the Provisional Rules of the Procedure
of the ... Committee.
14 5
141 The 1967 wheat agreement concluded between the Canadian Wheat Board and the China
National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation does not contain an arbi-
tration clause for dispute settlement, yet it requires that, in case of dispute, "the Sellers undertake
to negotiate with the Buyers an amicable settlement in respect of any loss sustained."
142 As of this time, China has not yet enacted a written code of commercial law or rules of
private international law, and has not published either judicial or arbitral decisions or scholarly
studies on the subjects. See Cohen, Chinese Law and Sino-American Trade, in CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS
AND U.S. POLICY 127, 164 (A. Eckstein ed. 1971).
143 See note 139 supra.
144 Thus, the most frequently found arbitration clause in a Sino-Canadian trade contract
contains the provision that "the case [in dispute] shall be referred to the Foreign Trade Arbi-
tration Committee [or the Maritime Arbitration Committee] of the China Council for the Pro-
motion of International Trade in Peking for arbitration according to the provisional rules of
procedure of the Council .. "
145 A similar clause contained in the uniform general charter of the China National Chartering
Corporation simply states that "the dispute shall ... be referred to arbitration in Peking or London,
in Defendant's option."
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This clause specifically designates China's Foreign Trade Arbitration Committee
as the arbitration organization in the event of arbitration in China, but no
counterpart is named if arbitration is to take place outside China. This will
invariably result in arbitration exclusively by Chinese arbitrators if arbitration
is to take place in China, because the members of China's Foreign Arbitration
Committee are all of Chinese nationality. 46 However, if arbitration is to be in
a foreign country, there is no similar assurance that the arbitrators will all
be fellow nationals of the foreign defendant. In this sense, the clause seems
to favor the Chinese side. In addition, it could lead to complicated maneuvering
by the parties to ensure designation as defendant, rather than as plaintiff, in
the arbitration proceedings.
Occasionally, Sino-Canadian trade contracts have called for arbitration
in a third country agreeable to both parties. This is especially true when the
contracts involve export of capital equipment to China. In such sales, the
Canadian firms have often insisted on such an arbitration clause because the
complexity of the goods tends to foster disputes. As a result of their strong
bargaining position in this area, they have generally been permitted to have their
way. Thus, a recent multi-million dollar contract for the supply of electronic
equipment by a leading U.S. subsidiary company in Canada to the China
National Machinery Import and Export Corporation contained the following
clause:
Each party shall appoint an arbitrator within 30 days after receipt of notifica-
tion from the opposite party and the two arbitrators thus appointed shall jointly
nominate a third person of Swedish nationality as umpire to form an arbitra-
tion committee. The arbitrators shall be confined to persons of Chinese and
American nationality.... The arbitration shall take place in Stockholm, Sweden,
in accordance with the Swedish Arbitration Procedures and with reference to the
Swedish Arbitration Laws.
1 47
This approach assures impartial arbitration, but it has the potential drawback
of placing the dispute before an arbitration tribunal whose rules and procedures
are unfamiliar to both parties. In one contract with Canadian traders, the
Chinese are known to have agreed to an arbitration clause designating the
Arbitration Court of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris as
the arbitration tribunal and its rules as the governing law of procedure.
Unlike those contained in the contracts between Western firms, none of the
arbitration clauses found in the China trade contracts stipulate the substantive
law to be applied by the arbitrators. Since China does not seem to have enacted
rules of private international law, it is difficult to determine what legal system
is to govern the contract. Wherever the arbitration may take place, if the tribunal
considers Chinese law the proper law of the contract, the foreign firms will
still be in a vulnerable position because law and procedures in China governing
148 See note 142 supra.
147 The arbitration clause limits the choice of arbitrators to those of "Chinese and American
nationality" because the contract was negotiated and executed by the Canadian firm's parent
company, although the goods were supplied by the Canadian firm.
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export and import activities are in a rudimentary state.1 48 It is extremely dif-
ficult to predict with confidence the legal position of the parties. The solution
may be for the parties to anticipate the substantial issues which might arise
during the performance of the contract, and then to fix their own law in the
contract.
Another problem concerns the enforcement of arbitration clauses. Neither
Canada nor China adheres to any multinational arbitration conventions, such as
the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923,'149 the Convention on the
Execution of Foreign Arbitration Awards of 1927,150 or the United Nations Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards of
1958.51 Nor is there a bilateral treaty providing for the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements and of awards in disputes between nationals of the two
countries.
The laws of both countries are silent as to whether an agreement to ar-
bitrate an existing or future foreign trade dispute is enforceable. In view of the
Chinese policy favoring arbitration of foreign trade disputes, such an agree-
ment would seem to be enforceable by Chinese courts. 15 2 In the common
law provinces of Canada, enforcement is also possible by the indirect use of
an application to stay litigation brought in violation of an agreement to arbi-
trate. 153 In Quebec, however, only the agreement to arbitrate an existing and
actual dispute (compromis) is enforceable; a promise to arbitrate a future dispute
(clause compromissoire) is not.154
148 See note 142 supra.
149 27 L.N.T.S. 157 (1924).
150 92 L.N.T.S. 301 (1927).
151 330 U.N.T.S. 38. The Convention was opened for signature on June 10, 1958. For a dis-
cussion of the Convention, see Springer, The U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, in AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, NEw STRATEGIES FOR PEACEFUL
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 25-26 (1971).1
-
2 See Li, Legal Aspects of Trade With Communist China, 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 67 (1964).
153 The nine common law provinces have almost identical legislation. Section 7 of the Ontario
Arbitration Act, ONT. REv. STAT. C. 25 (1970), which is typical, reads as follows:
If a party to a submission, or a person claiming through or under him, commences any legal
proceeding in any court against any other party to the submission, or any person claiming
through or under him, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to such
legal proceeding may at any time after appearance and before delivering any pleading or
taking any other step in the proceeding apply to that court to stay the proceeding and ajudge
of that court, if satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be
referred in accordance with the submission and that the applicant was at the time when the
proceeding was commenced and still remains ready and willing to do all things necessary to
the proper conduct of the arbitration, may make an order staying the proceeding.
The word "submission" is defined in section 1(d) as "a written agreement to submit present or
future differences to arbitration, whether or not an arbitrator is named therein." The court has
complete discretion as to whether to stay the action. In most cases stays are granted. In fact,
where there is a submission to a foreign arbitration tribunal, the case for a stay may well be stronger
than if a domestic arbitration agreement were involved. See Planned Sales, Ltd. v. Einson-Freeman
International (Americas), Ltd., [1955] Ont. W.N. 443, 447 (H. Ct. 1955); Kennedy, Ltd. v. Fiat,
[1923] Ont. W.N. 537 (S. Ct. 1923). But cf. A. S. May Co., Ltd. v. Robert Reford Co., Ltd., 6
D.L.R.3d 288 (Ont. H. Ct. 1969).
154 In a recent decision in Borenstein v. Trans-American Investment & Development Co. Ltd.
& Langenauer, [1970] C.S. 192, the Quebec Superior Court held that a contract clause requiring
the parties to submit all disputes to "final and binding arbitration" was against public order and
unenforceable. Cf Brierley, Aspects of the Promise to Arbitrate in the Law of Quebec, 30 R. Du B. 473
(1970); Colas, Clause compromissoire, compromis et arbitrage en droit nouveau, 28 R. DU B. 129, 133
228 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
As to the enforcement of arbitration awards, all Sino-Canadian trade con-
tracts stipulate that the awards given "shall be final and binding upon both
parties." The same provision is also found in the Chinese arbitration rules
which, moreover, prohibit the parties to "bring an appeal for revision before
a court of law or any other organization."1 55 In China, therefore, the arbitra-
tion award rendered by Chinese arbitration committees must be executed
by the parties within the time fixed by the award, otherwise one of the parties
may petition the court to enforce it.156 The fate of foreign arbitration awards
in Chinese courts is nevertheless uncertain. Considering again the Chinese
policy favoring arbitration as a means of settling foreign trade disputes, it
seems likely that the Chinese courts would also eriforce foreign awards. In
practice, however, no question about the enforcement of an award, Chinese or
otherwise, has ever arisen. As in China, a foreign trade arbitration award,
whether rendered locally or otherwise, is enforceable in all Canadian provinces
upon obtaining leave from a Canadian court having jurisdiction. 57 An arbi-
tration award that has been made enforceable by a foreign judgment may also
be enforced in Canada as a judgment.158
Despite the widespread adoption of arbitration clauses in Sino-Canadian
contracts, there is no record of any arbitration between Canadian firms and the
Chinese.159 The very few reported disputes have all been resolved amicably
by direct negotiations between the parties. 160 This is not surprising, as Canadian
businessmen who are invariably anxious to establish a foothold in the China
markets tend to be rather cautious and conciliatory in dealing with the Chinese,
and the latter, in turn, are known for their honesty and scrupulousness in
international transactions.
(1968); Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, Arbitration in the Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec, 3 R.J.T.
143, 159 (1968); Toth, in LECTURES, BAR OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC, THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 141 (1966); Tyndale, Notes on the New Code of Civil Procedure, 26 R. DUB. 345, 359 (1966).
1'5 See article 31 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Com-
mittee (FTAC), in TRADE WrrH CHINA, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 98-104 (1957), and article 33 of
the Provisional Rules of the Maritime Arbitration Committee (MAC), in 3 INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 138-41 (P. Sanders ed. 1965).
116 See article 32 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Com-
mittee (FTAC), in TRADE WITH CHINA, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 98-104 (1957), and article 32 of the
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Maritime Arbitration Committee (MAC), in 3 INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 138-41 (P. Sanders ed. 1965).
1'7 See, e.g., section 13 of the Ontario Arbitration Act which says that "[an award may, by
leave of a judge, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order to the same effect."
In Quebec, however, a normal court action has to be instituted for this purpose. See Quebec Code
of Civil Procedure § 950 (1966). For a discussion of the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards
in Canada, see Castel, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Personam and in Rem in
the Common Law Provinces of Canada, 17 Mc GILL LJ. 11, 183-88 (1971); Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski,
supra note 154, at 152-56.
158 Thus, in Stolp & Co. v. Browne & Co., 66 Ont. L.R. 73, 38 Ont. W.N. 400, 4 D.L.R. 73
(Ont. S. Ct. 1930), noted in 12 CAN. B. REv. 259 (1934), the Supreme Court of Ontario held that
a foreign judgment pursuant to a foreign arbitration award may be enforced in Ontario by action.
159 According to Fellhauer, however, among the 61 cases arbitrated by the Chinese arbitration
committees as of 1960, some did involve Canadian parties. See H. FELLHAUER, FOREIGN TRADE
ARBITRATION JURISDICTION IN THE P.R.C. 6 (U.S.Joint Publication Research Service, No. 8612,1961).
160 The well-publicized complaint by the Chinese against the Canadian Wheat Board in
November of 1970 concerning infested grain allegedly delivered was quickly and amicably settled
pursuant to an agreement by the parties to readjust the prices. See Edmonton Journal, Nov. 9,
1970, at 1, col. 1.
SINO-CANADIAN TRADE
CONCLUSION
The legal institutions governing Canada's trade with China do not differ
greatly in their fundamental features from those involving other countries.
The incompleteness of China's formal domestic legal system and its lack of either
a civil or commercial code make it difficult, if not impossible, to predict or
discuss technical legal aspects of China's foreign trade, such as the problems
concerning letters of credit, force majeure, and choice of law,16 1 but this has
presented no significant obstacle to Sino-Canadian trade. In fact, as an inter-
national trader, China offers a comparatively risk-free market. The existing
legal framework governing Sino-Canadian trade, although it might well be
improved, seems to be adequate for present purposes, and may well prove
to be a promising model for future Sino-American trade.
In international trade, law is not an end but a technique to achieve certain
economic and political goals. In the final analysis, therefore, actual expansion
of trade depends primarily upon political and economic factors. Because Canada
was the first major Western nation to recognize China after French recog-
nition in 1964, and because Canada played an important role in helping China
win its seat in the United Nations, many Canadians have felt that Canada has
a preferred position politically. 162 This feeling may prove to be only partly
justified. In view of the slight success of Canadian traders, as compared to
British, French, and Japanese firms selling technological products to the Chi-
nese,163 economic considerations may still take priority over political considera-
tions in China's international trade. Economically, Canada and China are
essentially competitive, rather than complementary. Canada can supply a
wide range of highly technological products and services to China, 6 4 but there
is not much Canada can import from China. As the balance of trade between
the two countries has already shifted drastically to one side as a result of the
wheat sales, there are only modest prospects of a significant increase in Sino-
Canadian trade beyond the current level.
161 For a first hand report of the current status of Chinese foreign trade law, see Cohen,
Report from China: Chinese Law at the Cross Roads, CHINA Q., Jan.-Mar. 1973, at 139, 142-43.
162 See generally IMPORTERS' BULL., Nov. 14, 1973.163 See Bums, Trudeau Seeking to Strengthen Trade With China in Areas Other Than Wheat, Toronto
Globe and Mail, Oct. 11, 1973, § B, at 4, col. 3.
164 For example, Canada's expertise in building railroads, its experience in the exploring,
mining and processing of metals, oils, and gas, its supply of a whole range of wood products
including low-cost prefabricated buildings, and its supply of turn-key fertilizer, synthetic rubber,
and other chemical plants. See Modak, China and the Pacfic Rim Community, EXECUTIVE, Apr.
1973, at 22, 24.
